Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California that would have prohibited defendants from using plaintiff’s trade name and trademark and from doing any act that would have caused the public to believe defendants’ products were sold under the supervision of plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed an action alleging numerous trademark violations by defendants. Plaintiff authorized a reseller to use the trademark. The reseller entered into a contract with defendants that allowed limited use of plaintiff’s trademark. The reseller terminated defendants’ use of the trademark after plaintiff received numerous complaints regarding defendants’ sales tactics. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to deny defendants’ further use of plaintiff’s trademark. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of the infringement claim and that there was a possibility of irreparable harm. The clear language of the contract between the reseller and defendants allowed the reseller to terminate the contract. Any use of the trademark after termination was unauthorized and would have caused confusion. The court found that the balance of hardships and public interest tipped in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s concerns about goodwill were justified after numerous, serious complaints about defendants. The public should not have been deceived by defendants’ use of plaintiff’s trademark. Parties’ litigation lawyer California appeal.
The court granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction because the contract authorizing defendants’ use of the trademark was terminated and any use of the trademark after termination was unauthorized. The court determined that the public would have been confused by defendants’ continued use of the trademark and plaintiff could have suffered loss of goodwill and reputation because of confusion.
A patent holder’s motion to dismiss the generic drug manufacturer’s 15 U.S.C.S. § 2 monopolization and related federal antitrust claims was granted where the allegations that survived Noerr-Pennington immunity failed to allege an antitrust injury. Because no federal issue survived, the state claims were no addressed.